Advertising, Pricing and Stability in Oligopolistic Markets for New Products by Fershtman, Chaim et al.
Southern Methodist University 
SMU Scholar 
Historical Working Papers Cox School of Business 
1-1-1983 





Southern Methodist University 
Eitan Muller 
Hebrew University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/business_workingpapers 
 Part of the Business Commons 
This document is brought to you for free and open access by the Cox School of Business at SMU Scholar. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Historical Working Papers by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more 
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. 
S:;. tj t··~ } ·_; c_f D l..:. .t·; j ::·:\~;SG !l rirn .~ :ll.st:ra t1o~ 
Southern Methodist Univera:itJ: 
Dall as. Texas 75275 , 
ADVERTISING, PRICING AND STABILITY IN OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS 
FOR NEW PRODUCTS 










Herman W. Lay Professor of Marketing 
Edwin L. Cox School of Business 
Southern Methodist University 




*This paper represents a draft of work in progress by the authors and is being 
sent to you for information and review. Responsibility for the contents rests 
solely with the authors. Thi s working paper may not be produced or distribut ed 
without the written consent of the authors. Please address all correspondence 
to Vijay Mahajan. 
Abstract 
In an oligopolistic market for a new product, individual competing firms 
may possess a differential advantage in terms of the initial goodwill. From a 
business policy perspective, the question is whether the competitive market 
equilibrium is affected by the initial goodwill of each firm. That is, do the 
final market shares depend on the initial stocks of goodwill of competing 
firms? 
For a consumer nondurable or a highly depreciable durable product in an 
oligopolistic market, we formulate this problem as a non-zero-sum, open loop, 
noncooperative differential game. It is assumed that the goodwills of the 
competing firms adjust according to the Nerlove-Arrow capital accumulation 
equation, i.e., 
is its advertis~ng level and oi is · its goodwill decay constant. A solution to 
such a game (a Nash Equilibrium) is a choice of price and advertising by the 
competing firms such that each maximizes his own discounted profits subject to 
his own goodwill accumulation and given the path of the rival. 
We prove existence of a Nash Equilibrium _and we shoYT the conditions under 
which the game converges to a particular stationary point regardless of the 
initial conditions. That is, we show the conditions under which the final 
market shares do not depend on the initial stocks of goodwill of competing 
firms. 
1. Introduction 
The success of any marketing strategy depends on the strengths of the 
competitive analysis on which it is based (Henderson 1983). Competitive 
analysis defines the arena in which a company's marketing strategy is 
conceived, planned and executed. It delineates the web that details the 
interface between the competitors and defines the variables that model a 
company's competitive strategy. In the presence of active competitors, the 
objective of competitive strategy is to provide the firm a unique differential 
advantage over its competitors for long run survival and profitability. 
Hence, the development of a firm's competitive behavior, i.e., assessment of 
the competitors' likely reactions to its strategic moves and their possible 
impact on its profitability. 
In assessing the competitive behavior, at one extreme we can assume that 
a firm operates with cotilpetitive independence as, for example, is the case in 
pure competition or monopolistic competition. In a purely competitive market, 
the firm has no problem of marketing strategy. All firms produce the same 
product and no firm charges more than the market price. All buyers have 
perfect information and advertising cannot be used as a competitive vehicle 
since buyers purchase strictly according to price. In the presence of 
monopolistic competition, although the buyers may perceive the various 
competitors offering a differentiated product in terms of certain attributes 
such as quality, service, etc., because of the large number of competitors, 
the competitive strategy developed by a firm may not provoke reaction from its 
competitors. 
The explicit consideration of competitive behavior becomes a must in 
oligopolistic markets where there are few firms (or duopolistic markets where 
they are two firms) since the competitive strategy developed by one firm ca:n 
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impact the profitability posture of its competitors. As articulated by Kotler 
(1971, p. 99), in the presence of active competitors, the competitors can be 
assumed to be very sensitive to the company's marketing plan, particularly its 
price and advertising. Hence, the firm must consider for any contemplated 
plan i, the competitors' most probably response, the firm's reaction, the 
competitor's next move, the firm's move and ad infinitum. The series of moves 
and countermoves, however, may eventually result in a competitive market 
equilibrium. That is, a state of the market where none of the oligopolists 
makes any further changes in its marketing plan since, given the equilibrium 
strategy of the competitors, no other marketing plan can yield a better 
performance. 
tn developing a competitive strategy, a firm can match the distinctive 
advantages of its competitors in terms of certain controllable strategic 
variables such as price and advertising. The one factor, however, that it can 
not match is their distinct advantage in terms of their initial stocks of 
goodwill. In a number of emerging oligopolistic markets for new products 
(e.g., telephone equipment and services, personal computers), often a firm may 
be competing with other firms who because of their name awareness, general 
favorable image and past track record in related products, may have an initial 
distinct advantage in approaching the market. From a business poliey 
perspective, the question is whether the competitive market equilibrium is 
affected by the initial goodwill of the individual firms. That is, do the 
final market shares depend upon the initial stocks o.f goodwill of competing 
firms? Or, is the initial goodwill really a strategic variable undertnining 
the competitive market equilibrium? 
In order to · investigate this question for a consumer nondurable or a 
highly depreciable durable product in an oligopolistic market, we formulate 
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the competitive strategy problem as a non-zero-sum, noncooperative 
differential game (Isaacs 1965; Case 1979). For the sake of analytical 
tractibiltiy, the formulation is confined to the case of duopoly. It is 
assumed that: (a) the key strategic or control variables defining the 
marketing plan of the individual firms are price and advertising, (b) the 
products offered by the two competing firms are close substitutes, and (c) the 
goodwills of the competing firms adjust according to the Nerlove-Arrow capital 
accumulation model (Nerlove and Arrow 1962). 
The representation of competitive encounters between the firms' by the 
means of differential games explicitly assumes that the competitors are 
rational and seek a known performance objective, e.g., discounted profits. 
Further assuming that the competing firms are in a situation of conflict or do 
not cooperate with each other, the differential game theory formulation lends 
itslef to the possible determination of competitive equilibrium or Nash 
equilibrium. For the proposed competitive strategy model, we prove existence 
of a Nash equilibrium and show the ·. conditions under which the game converges 
to a particular stationary point regardless of the initial goodwill 
conditions. That is, we delineate conditions under which the final market 
shares of the competing firms do not depend upon their initial stocks of 
goodwill. 
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the 
model formulation. Section 3 develops necessary conditions for Nash 
equilibrium solutions. Section 4 addresses the question of equilibrium 
stability or the existence of a stationary equilibrium. The paper concludes 
with Section 5 summarizing the significance of the model, its relation to 
other works on the subject in marketing, and possible extensions. 
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2. Model Formulation 
Consider a model where there are two firms operating on a single 
market. The goodwills of the two firms at time t are denoted by x(t) and y(t) 
respectively. For simplicity, we model the change over time of the goodwills 




where oi is the goodwill depreciation parameter of firm i, a dot above a 
variable represents differentiation with respect to time and ui is the 
advertising effects of firm i. The cost of having the effects of u1 is given 
by Ci(ui) for some convex cost function C. 
Equation (1) can be thought of as a parsimonious representation of a 
diffusion process without the word-of-mouth effect. (See Dodson and Muller 
(1978), where the model was shown to be a special case of the model by Bass 
(1969).) As in Horsky (1977), we assume that the market shares are functions 
of the respective goodwills. The difference in the formulation is due to the 
fact that we wish to introduce pricing and their effect in combination with 
advertising on profits and market shares. 
Moreover, we are interested in formulating the competitive effect as a 
game in which the two players compete in the market place using both price and 
advertising as strategic variables. 
Since advertising bas multiperiod cumulative effect, the game bas a 
dynamic structure. The decision of the firm today affects its position and 
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its rival's position (as captured by goodwill levels or market shares) not 
only today but in the future as well. Thus the natural technique which 
describes such a business environment is a differential game. 
Denote the highest achievable goodwill level as N. If the goodwill is 
interpreted, for example, as the number of people who are potential (or 
current) customers, then N is the total number of people in the market. If, 
however, the goodwill is interpreted as a stock of advertising goodwill, then 
the ceiling will be a natural result of the ceiling we shall shortly impose on 
the rate of advertising u. 
Consider the following probabilities of purchase and Figure 1. With 
probability (1-x/N) the consumer is not .a potential customer of firm 1 (e.g., 
is not aware of firm 1 or the brand of firm 1 is not in his evoked set or he 
is loyal to firm 2). With probability x/N he is a potential customer and then 
either a) he is not a customer of firm 2 (with probability (1-y/N)) and 
purchases at a rate of a(p1) or b) he is a customer of firm 2 (with 
probability y/N) and purchases at a rate of b(p1, p2), where p1 and p2 are the 
prices of firms 1 and 2 respectively. 
Giventhat there are N number of potential customer-s, expected sales for 
firm 1 at any time can be written as: 
(2) s1 = (x/N(l-y/N)a(p1 ) + x/N y/N b(p1,p2))N 












probability = y/N 
purchase rate 
b(pl,p2) 
x and y are the goodwill levels of firm 1 and 2 and pi is the price of 
firm i = 1, 2. 
Figure 1 
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where c is the production cost. We assume that the production costs for both 
firms are the same and also they do not change over time. Each firm now 
wishes to maximize its own discounted profits by employing the optimal 
paths of pricing and advertising given the path of its rival. This, formally' 
is a non-zero-sum, noncooperative, open loop differential game whose solution 
can be achieved by using control theory. In order to define the game 
formally, we need to define the payoffs and the strategy sets. Let the payoff 
for firm i be defined as discounted profits, i.e., 
(4) 
Let the strategy set Si be all piecewise continuous functions defined on 
[O,CD), that take their values in a compact set [O,ui]. For example, the cost 
Ci(ui) which is convex and satisfies that lim c1 + .CD as u1 + ui will induce a 
control function as desired. Equation (4) assumes that the discounting rate, 
r, for both the firms is the same. 
For every initial stock of goodwills Xo and y0 , define the game G(x0 ,y0) 
as the game with strategy set Si, payoff functions Ji, i = 1, 2; and at t .= 0, 
the game starts at the initial stocks of x(O) = XC and y(O) = Yo• A Nash 
* * * * E'quili,brium for the game G(Xc>,Yo) is a set of function u 1(t), p1(t), u 2(t), p2(t), 
* ~ . * * such that ui(t), p1 (t) maximizes Ji subject to (l.i) given uj(t), pj(t) for 
j .,. i. 
* A stationary Nash Equilibrium is a pair of values up 
* * * * 
* * * * * X ' pl; u2' y ' Pz 
* such that u 1 = and u 1, p1 , u2, p2 is a Nash equilibrium for 
* the game G(x , 
Note that in a stationary Nash equilibrium, prices, advertising and 
goodwills do not change overtime. 
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2.1 Purchase Rate Specification 
In order to establish Nash solutions to the differential game specified 
by equations ( 4), ( 1.1) and (1. 2), it is first necessary to specify the 
purchase rates a(p1) and b(p1, p2) in equation (3). Following Eliashberg and 
Jeuland (1982), Wolf and Shubik (1978), and McGuire and Stailen (1982), we 
assume a linear purchase rate equation. That is, 
(5) 
When both firms charge the same price, i.e., p1 = p2 , we assume that they 
distribute the market according to ai and thus the purchase rate function for 
the firm in the market in which it is a monopolist is given by 
(6) 
Note, for example, that if a 1 = a 2 , then the difference between the market for 
the monopolist and the market for the oligopolist is that in the latter, when 
prices are qual, the oligopolists split the monopolist's market into two equal 
shares. The firm thus can be thought of as having two types of market. In 
one, it is a monopolist facing the demand of a1 (p1 ) and in the other, it is an 
oligopolist facing the demand given by bi(p1,p2). The firm cannot price 
discriminate. However, if it could, it would have chosen a different price 
m c fo,r its monopolist and oligopolist markets denoted by p1 and P1 
respect'! vely. To determine these prices, note that if the firm could price 
discriminate, it would have chosen p~ so that it maximizes (p 1-c)a1(p1), in 
the monopolistic market and it would have chosen p~ so that it maximizes (p 1-
c)b(p1,p2) in its oligopolistic market, where c is the production cost. 
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Performing the differentiation with respect to price, and solving 
m c for p1 and p1 , we get that these prices are given by: 
* The optimal price for the firm denoted by p1 is bounded between these two 
prices, i.e., 
c m Since p1 + p1 as y + 0, the optimal price of the firm at each period of time 
will be closer to the monopolist price as the effect of competition (i.e., y) 
lessens. 
* The two profit functions are depicted in Figure 2. At p1 , the monopolist 
profits are still increasing while the oligopolist is decreasing. Thus, when 
the firm sets a single price, it does so because it cannot price 
differentiate. If it could, it would have differentiated the price to its two 
markets. This fact will help to indicate the effect of increase on either x 
or y on the price. 
3. Market Equilibrium 
3.1 Price Equilibrium 
Subs.titution of equations (5) and (6) into equation (3) for each of two 
·firms and further differentiation with respect to p1 and p2 yields the 
following first order condition for the maximization of profit, given by 




Note that the ~i and ei represent the marginal profit of the monopolist and 
the oligopolist market respectively. Thus ~i > 0 and e1 < 0 (see Figure 2). 
A decrease in y, for example, will cause the monopolist part of the 
market of firm 1 to expand which will cause the price to move towards the 
monopolist price, i.e., to increase. Ail increase in x will cause in. much the 
same way a decrease in the price of firm 2 which will trigger a decrease in 
firm 1's price as well. 'nlus both prices are decreasing in x andy. To show 
* this formally, define the solutions of (8.1) and (8.2) to be p1 = f(x,y) and 
* p2 = g(x,y). What we show in Appendix 1 is that fx and fy are negative and 
similarly for ~ and ~· 
The price competition in the industry can be described by a reaction 
function analysis. Equations (8.1) and (8.2) -form a system of reaction 
function whi.ch can be depicted in a p1 x p2 plane as in Figure 3. For 
example, equation · (8.1) can be thought of as setting the price p1 for firm 1 
given the price Pz of the competitor. Thus it yields the reaction of firm 1 
to any price changes of firm 2. 
















have positive slopes. 
The condition rr 1 guarantees that there is a 
unique intersection point of the two reaction functions. This intersection 
point defines the equilibrium ''prices. Thus at every time t the market is in a 
short run equilibrium in prices. This equilibrium depends upon the goodwill 
levels x and y. Changes of these goodwill levels will cause a change in 
reaction functions which will result in a different equilibrium price. For 
example, if y increases, the reaction function of the second firm (equation 
8.2) does not change. But, as it depicted in figure (3), the reaction 
function of firm 1 shifts leftward which will be followed by lower equilibrium 
prices. 
Since for every t we can find the equilibrium prices as a function of the 
state variables, and since prices do not affect the goodwill variables, we can 
divide the competition in the market into twe phases. At every time t, for a 
given x and y, the firms compete via prices. Given the result of this 
competition, the firms' payoffs can be described as a function just of the 
goodwill levels, and thus firms will be engaged in a dynamic competition via 
their investments in their respective goodwills, namely-, advertising. 
Prices thus are adjusted instantaneously, and are dependent on the levels 
of goodwills at the time they are adjusted. The revenue function of firm i 
can now be written as 
(9) Ri(x,y) = Tii(f(x,y), _g(x,y),x,y) 
The maximization of equation (4) can now be done with respect to the 
advertising level only. 
- !.J -
Concavity of the revenue function is needed for sufficiency; i.e., 
concavity implies that the necessary conditions are also sufficient and we are 
assured that the policy we designate as "optimal" is indeed a maximum. 
Thus for firm 1 we need concavity of Ri with respect to x. In Appendix 1 
we show that if y ( k(a1 + a 2)/2, then indeed R1 is concave in x. The 
interpretation of this condition is as follows: Note that 
jab/3p1 j = ka1 + y and that jaa1/3p1 j = k(a1+a2). Thus the slope of the 
demand of the monopolist will be larger than the one by the oligopolist if 
jaa/3p1 j > lab/3p1 j which will hold if y ( a1k. Similarly for firm 2 we 
have Y ( a2 k. These two conditions clearly imply that y is smaller than the 
mean of (a2 + a2)k as required. These conditions imply that both the 
elasticity of the monopolist will be sm:aller than the oligopolist and that the 
demand for the product in the monopolistic market will always be larger (for a 
given price) than the demand for the product in the oligopolistic market. 
This clearly is an intuitive requirement since we can expect the pri.ce 
sensitivity of individuals to be larger in the oligopolistic situation. 
3.2 Nash Equilibrium 
The choice of pricing and advertising is done simultaneously as discussed 
in the last section, however, since the -choice of price is time autonomous, 
prices depend on the level of goodwills only. Solving for P1 and P2 as 
functions of goodWills and substituting the result into the objective function 
Ji defined in equation (4), we get: 
Each firm now maximizes Ji with respect to ui, subject to the state constraint 
(1. i). 
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Fershtman and Muller (1983) have proved that if Ri is a concave function, 
Rixx and ~xy are bounded and Ci is bounded from below then the differential 
game ~(x0 , y0) associated with Ji and (1.i) has a Nash equilibrium solution 
for any initial conditions x0 , Yo• In Appendix 1 we show that R1xx < 0 and 
thus Ri is a concave function of x if 2y < (a1 + a 2 )k. Under the same 
condition, we show in Appendix 2 that ~ xy and ~xx are bounded. Thus to 
guarantee the existence of · a solution to the game we need just the two 
conditions that 2y < ('a1 + a 2)k and that C" > e: for some e: > 0. The first 
assumption was elaborated upon in the previous section. The second 
assumption, because of the assumed convexity of C implies that at zero level 
of advertising C":l: 0. For example, a quadratic funtion satisfies this 
condition. The way to show existence in the finite horizon case is to form a 
set of functions Bi of all possible goodwill paths of player i. Since ui is 
bounded~ this family is closed and equicontinuous and thus it is compact. 
For each goodwill path of player 2, there exists a goodwill path of 
player 1. This is simply done by solving the control problem of player 1 
given the path of player 2 and observing that the solution of the control 
problem is indeed a maximum since the Hamiltonian is concave in x by our 
assumption that 2y ·< (a1 + a 2)k. The function that assigns a path of x given 
the path of y , and vice versa is continuous from a compact convex set into 
itself and thus we canuse a fixed point theorem to prove existence of an 
equilibrium. 
In the infinite horizon case we multiply B by an exponential decay factor 
of e-rt to achieve compactness and the rest of the proof follows much the same 
way. 
In the one player case, f or each intial _condition x0 there exists a 
unique optimal path. Moreover this path converges to a steady state, i.e., a 
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point at which all three variables, price, advertising and goodwill are 
stationary (see Gould (1970)). In the two players case, i.e. the game 
situation, there is no guaranteed uniquness. Indeed for any initial condition 
x0 , Yo there might be several Nash equilibria. The possibility that one of 
these will converge to a stationary point will be discussed in the next 
section. Clearly it is possible to have a solution which does not converge to 
any stationary point. For example, if one player decides to employ a cyclical 
advertising and consequently cyclical goodwill policy, it is straightforward 
to show that the best reply for the second firm is to employ cyclical policy 
as well. 
Recall that the result of . the optimization with respect to price can be 
* * written as Pi = f(x,y), Pz • g(x,y) where the derivatives of both functions 
with respect to the two variables are negative. Differentiating with respect 
to .time yields: 
• * • • (10.1) pl 
- f X + f y X y 
.. 
* • 
• (10. 2) Pz .., g X + gr X 
Thus when both goodwills are increasing, i.e. the market expands, prices 
will fall. Since the market size in dollar terms i.e. '11'(P1 ,P2 ,X,Y) depends 
not only on the level of goodwills but on prices as well, this will cause a 
further expansion in the market size. The period of expansion is thus a 
combination of goodwill accumulation which is ,a result of high levels of 
advertising and a decline of prices through time. In case that both level o.f 
goodwills decline, the reverse happens and prices increase. If one variable, 
say x, increases and y decreases, then we cannot determine a priori the price 
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movement over time. 
Suppose the game starts with no accumulation of goodwill, then 
initially ~ and y are positive and thus both prices decline. It is important 
to note that this is due to the effect of competition. In the one player 
case, this monopolist will change a fixed (monopoly) price and though it will 
accumulate goodwill so as to increase his market size and thus profits, the 
price will remain constant throughout the planning horizon. The effect of 
goodwill accumulation of his rival in the two player case initially causes the 
firm to counteract this goodwill growth by a price decline. At a later date 
when the goodwill level is high enough, it is possible to counteract his 
rival's goodwill growth by increasing the price and decreasing his own 
goodwill level. Since the firm overcapitalized intially, it now reduces the 
stock to its optimal level. 
4. Stability 
As discussed in the previous section, the problem does not have a unique 
solution and there are solutions which are cyclical. We are interested, 
however, in the existence of solutions which are more stable than the above, 
i.e. solutions which approach a stationary equilibrium! A stationary 
equilibrium is defined as in the one player case as an equilibrium of the game 
in which all variables are stationary. Once the path of the solution reaches 
the stationary point, it stays there fovever. Note that for every stat±onary 
level of y, there exists a level of x such that both will remain stationary. 
What we show, however, is that even when they . do not start at the stationary 
point, the system will converge towards it as time tends to infinity. Given 
that the current value Hamiltonian for firm 1 is: 
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the necessary conditions for player 1 are as follows: 
(12) 
( 1.1) 
Differentiating equation (12) with respect to time, and 
substituting >. and >.• from (12) and (11) respectively yield the following 
equation: 
(13) 
• • When the system is stationary, i.e. u = x = 0, the stationary equilibrium is a 
solution of the following equations: 
(14) 
.( 15) 
where · in equation (14), 61x was substituted .for u1 and similarly for (15). 
* * This forms a nonlinear system of two equations with two unknow-ns x and y -
the stationary equilibrium point. 
Note that the system, since it is nonlinear, might have multiple 
solutions. None of the solutions depend on the initial conditions x0 and 
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4• The uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium point is guaranteed if the 
following condition holds (see appendix 3): 
(16) 
The likelihood of this condition to hold is greater the more convex the cost 
function is (C > 0) measures the convexity of C), the more concave the 
revenue function is (R1xx and Rzxy). The first two conditions are rather 
standard in that they correspond to the regualr requirements of strict 
convexity/concavity. The fact that more than just concavity (convexity) is 
needed for the uniqueness of the convergence point can be found for example in 
the economic literature on global stability. See for example Cass and Shell 
(1976). The requirement on the absolute value of Rxy should be elaborated 
upon: Note that if jR~j > jR{j, then condition (16) holds. This, however, 
can be interpreted as follows: Rix is the marginal revenue of firm i. The 
effect of a change in yon Rrx should be smaller that the effect of 1's own 
goodwill (x) on R1x. Suppose it is not, then when 2 changes its goodwill 
level, and 1 reacts, then tocounteract the change in y, x has to make a large 
change in x since R1xx is smaller. But this large change will induce an even 
larger change in y since R2YY is smaller than Rzyx and so a large change in y 
is necessitated to counteract the change in X. Clearly such a case, when 
IRrxxl < I Rrxyl is very unstable. 
In our example of linear demand function it is straightforward to show 
that if y is small enough and C convex enough than (16) holds (note that R1xx, 
R2xy are continuous in y and compute (16) when y = O). 
The way to show the existence of a Nash Equilibrium that converges to the 
(unique} stationary point is to define the family B (as in section 4) as the 
·--- ----------- - ----
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set of goodwill paths that converge to the stationary point. The set is 
conpact (with the appropriate decay factor) as a subset of the previous class, 
and convex. Since the best response for a convergent goodwill path is to 
converge as well (to the same point since it is unique) we can use the fixed 
point theorem and therefore for every initial conditions x0 and y0 , there 
exists a Nash equilibrium which converges to the stationary point. The 
stationary point, as mentioned earlier, is independent of the initial 
conditions. 
Since prices are determined at each period, prices at the stationary 
point are independent of the initial stock of goodwill as well. Thus market 
shares at the stationary equilibrium will be independent of the initial market 
shares at the start of the game! 
5. Conclusions 
In recent years, a number of analytical approaches have been suggested in 
marketing to model competitive encounters among competing firms (for a brief 
review, see Dolan ( 1981)). Examples of such ap.proaches include judgmental 
models, reaction matrix approach, simulation and game theory. Dolan (1981) 
cites an example of a competitive pricing model developed by General Electric 
Corporation Consulting Services where deterministic management judgments are 
used to model competitive reaction. Developed by Lambin, Naert and Bultez 
(1975) and extended by Hanssens (1980), reaction matrix approach estimates 
competitive reaction elasticities for the various marketing mix elements based 
on historical data. 
The differential game theory framework for competitive analysis 
explicitly considers two critical aspects of market behavior--competition and 
dynamics. In this respect, it is a powerful tool to examine the diffusion of 
new products in a competitive market (Mahajan and Muller 1979). 
- 20 -
Since the seminal work of Bass (1969), recent extensions of diffusion 
models dealing with the nature of diffusion models (Easingwood, Mahajan and 
Muller 1983), estimation issues (Bretschneider and Mahajan 1980; Lilien, Rao 
and Kalish 1981; Schmittlein and Mahajan 1982), pricing strategies (Robinson 
and Lakhani 1975; Bass 1980; Dolan and Jeuland 1981; Clarke, Darrough and 
Heineke 1982; Bass and Bultez 1983; Kalish 1983), advertising strategies 
(Dodson and Muller 1978; Horsky and Simon 1983), product interdependence 
(Peterson and Mahajan 1978), market size (Mahajan and Peterson 1978), repeat 
purchase (Dodson and Muller 1978; Lilien, Rao and Kalish 1981; Mahajan, Wind, 
and Sharma 1983) and time-space integration (Haynes, Mahajan and White 1977); 
Mahajan and Peterson 1978) have implicitly assumed the presence of 
monopolistic competition. However, fol;' a number of products this assumption 
is unrealistic and myopic. 
Assuming that competitors-use explicit decision rules t 0 set their 
marketing plans that are known to the firm, the medium of simulation has been 
used to investigate competitive behavior. (For an example of a simulation 
model for the evaluation of pricing strategies in a duopolistic market, see 
Clarke and Dolan (1983)). Recent years, however, have seen a burgeoning 
interest in using game theory to model the dynamic competitive behavior for 
new products. Mate (1982), for example, has modeled the competition between 
two firms as a two-person, non-zero-sum, noncooperative Markovian game to 
study optimal advertising behavior. Deal (1979) and Eliashberg and Jeuland 
(1982) have used a non-zero-sum differential game framework to examine optimal 
advertising expenditures and pricing strategies, respectively, in a 
duopolistic market over a finite planning hori·zon. Teng and Thompson (1980) 
and Thompson and Teng (1980) have developed differential game oligopoly models 
to derive optimal advertising and pricing policies. 
- .:.l -
The work reported here complements the efforts of Eliashberg and Jeuland 
(1982), Teng and Thompson (1980) and Rao (1982) in examining the diffusion of 
a new product in the realistic setting of market competition. The main 
difference between these works and ours is in the objective of the papers. 
Eliasber~ and Jeuland are mainly interested in the effects of entry on pricing 
stategies. Teng and Thompson are mainly investigating the effects of 
competition on advertising policies when the oligopolists "learn by doing." 
Rao investigates the problem of investment on goodwill in a model which is 
similar to ours and looks for conditions which will guarantee local stability 
of the steady state. 
There are differences in the technical aspects of the papers which are 
worthwhile highlighting here. Eliasberg and Jeuland have a finite time 
differential game for which they show existence of a Nash equilibrium by a 
simulation analysis for various values of the parameters. We could not have 
used such a method since convergence to a stationary equilibrium occurs at 
infinity and cleary simulation cannot be held for infinite horizon. The 
numerical method (for a quadratic cost fuction) was also employed by Teng an 
Thompson. Rao, on the other hand, has tried to prove existence for the 
general case but his attempt is somewhat troublesome•! The main technical 
difference, however, is that he investigates local stability properties and 
not global ones. Thus for small perturbations around the stationary 
equilibrium point, the paths will return this stationary point. This does not 
address the question we pose in this paper of the total independence of the 
stationary point from the initial starting point, since there is no a priori 
reason to believe that the starting point wil~ be in a small neighborhood 
around the stationary point. 
The implication of the proposed model should be of interest to both 
practitioners and researchers. In a number of emerging oligopolistic markets 
for new products, the market may be dominated by a single or multiple 
competitors in terms of their initial goodwills. (Examples include IBM, Apple 
and Texas Instruments in the market for personal computers and Bell telephone 
for equipment and services). The key question is whether the initial goodwill 
enjoyed by a competitor gives a distinctive strategic advantage and can it 
effect the market equilibrium? The results reported in this paper delineate 
the conditions under which the market equilibrium is not affected by the 
initial stocks of goodwill. 
The proposed model is not wirhout shortcomings. However, these 
shortcomings should be considered as possible avenues for further 
extensions. First, the model assumes that a firm's goodwill is primarily 
generated through advertising and ignores the effect of word-of-mouth 
communication. Second, we assume that the new product under consideration is 
a consumer nondurable or a highly depreciable durable product. Third, it is 
assumed that the production costs of the competing firms are the same and 
remain constant over the entire diffusion period, ignoring learrting or 
experience effects. Fourth, we assume that in discounting their profits, 
competing firms use the same discounting rate. Finally, it is assumed that 
all the competing firms have a single known objective and ignore the 
possibility of multiple or different objectives. 
Future research should strive towards the relaxation of these assumptions 
to examine innovation diffusion in more realistic competitive settings. 
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Appendix 1 
Let P1 = f(x,y) and P2 = g(x,y). We wish to show that R1xx and ~xx are 
negative if 2y ( (a1 + a 2)k. We show that Rxx1 < 0. The proof that Rxx2 < 0 
follows symmetrically. Substituting the first order conditions into the 
objective function ~ 1 we get: 
R xx = 4 (f-c)n f + 2xn [f 2 + (f-c)f ] 1 X X XX 
From the first order conditions, define L as tlie solution for P2 as a function 
of P1 i.e. Pz = L(P1). L is thus given by 
From the discussion in section (3) it is evident that c~~ 1 is positive 
and el negative. 
Substitute L into the first order condition for firm 2 to achieve the 
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following 
0 = F(x,y) = (N-x) ~ 2 (L) + xe 2(L), where 
As before <!l2 > 0 and e2 < O. It is straightforward to check that 
fx = -oF/oX/ oF/ ap 1 is negative and thus we are left to show that 
f 2x + (f-c)fxx is negative • . fxx can be computed to be: 
Since (a1 + a2 )k - 2y > 0 (by assumption), fxx < 0. 
f 2 + (f-c)f ~ (l/3F/aP1)2 A where X XX 
In order to show that A < 0, first it is straightforward to show that 
a A/Oy > 0 and A is negative as y + 0. Since P2c < P1 < P1m (defined in 
section 3) it is easily shown that P1 > l/3k + 2c/3. Substituting this lower 
bound it is evident that where 2y = (a1 + a 2)k, A < 0. Thus as long as 
2y ' (a1 + a 2)k, R1xx < 0. 
Q. E. D. 
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Appendix 2 
Following Appendix 1, Rxx and Rxy can be written as: 1 1 
Rxx = 4 (f-c)nf + 2xn [f 2 + (f-c) f ] 1 X X XX 
R xy = 2(f-c)nf + 2x nfxfy + 2x n(f-c)fxy +((f-c) 2 + 2x(f-c)f )n 1 y X y 
Since both x and y are bounded between zero and N, in order to show the 
boundedness of the above expressions, we only have to show the boundedness of 
First, note that L is bounded as y tends to zero since 4> ( p 1) + 0 as y + 0. 
The limit of their ratio can be found to be finite by using L'Hospital rule 
since y(O) ) 0. Clearly Lp is bounded from below. Thus, 3F/3p is bounded 
from below and aF/ax and 3F/ay from above. Thus fx and fy are bounded~ With 
respect to fxx (and similarly fxy) divide nominator and denominator by Lp. As 




Define x = ~ 1 (y) and y = ~z(x) ~s the solutions of (14) and (15) 
respectively. Since R~x and 
the sign of R~. If R~ and 
unique. 
I R~y are negative, the sign of ~i is the same as 
If R~ > 
l. 
-1 I point, (~ 1 ) 
R~ have opposite signs, the stationary point is 
0, then it is sufficient to prove that at every stationary 
-1 I I 
If R~ < 0, it suffices to show that (~ 1 ) < ~ 2 • In 
both cases, computing these derivatives yield .condition (16). Q.E.D. 
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NOTE 
1Rao's proof is problematic. He bases his proof on an existence theorem 
by Fried~n (1977, theorem 7.1) which is based on the Brower fixed point 
theorem. This theorem cannot be used here since in Rao's case a strategy is a 
sequence. with infinite number of elements. Rao also claims that his strategy 
set is compact and convex with respect to a specific metric he defines. This 
complicates his proof considerably, since now he has to prove any claim he 
makes in his existence proof with respect to the new metri-c. Moreover, 
compactization is not that difficult to achieve. What is difficult is to gain 
compactness without losing continuity • . Thus an argument is needed to show 
that the best response function is continuous. This is the core of his proof 
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